or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the Income Tax Act, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the Canada Pension Plan if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection [page450] 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the Income Tax Act,

(b) any provision of the Canada Pension Plan or of the Employment Insurance Act that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the Canada Pension Plan, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the Employment Insurance Act, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224 (1.2) of the Income Tax Act, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the Income Tax Act, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the Canada Pension Plan if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the Canada Pension Plan in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

[page451]

37. (1) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.
(2) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the Income Tax Act, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the Canada Pension Plan or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the Employment Insurance Act (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the Income Tax Act and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the Income Tax Act, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the Canada Pension Plan,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.


222. (1) [Trust for amounts collected] Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) [Amounts collected before bankruptcy] Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

(3) [Extension of trust] Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount
was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)

67. (1) [Property of bankrupt] The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that is against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the Income Tax Act, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the Canada Pension Plan or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the Employment Insurance Act (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the Income Tax Act and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the Income Tax Act, or
(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the Canada Pension Plan,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) [Status of Crown claims] In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...  

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the Income Tax Act;

(b) any provision of the Canada Pension Plan or of the Employment Insurance Act that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the Canada Pension Plan, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the Employment Insurance Act, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224 (1.2) of the Income Tax Act, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the Income Tax Act, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the Canada Pension Plan if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada
or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the Canada Pension Plan in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

Appeal allowed with costs, ABELLA J. dissenting.

Solicitors:

Solicitors for the appellant: Fraser Milner Casgrain, Vancouver.

Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Canada, Vancouver.

1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:

11. Despite anything in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.
Case Name:
Allarco Entertainment Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF Allarco Entertainment Inc. and Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. and Alliance Films Inc.

2009 ABQB 503
58 C.B.R. (5th) 140
12 Alta. L.R. (5th) 341
[2010] 4 W.W.R. 299
483 A.R. 53

2009 CarswellAlta 1458
180 A.C.W.S. (3d) 569

Docket: 0903 09146
Registry: Edmonton

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
Judicial District of Edmonton

J.B. Veit J.

Heard: September 2, 3, 8 and 9, 2009.

(63 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Debtor company -- Compromises and arrangements -- Directions -- Eligible financial contract -- Motion by creditor for finding court lacked jurisdiction to vary contract and debtor unable to repudiate contract allowed in part -- Creditor offered debtor right to advertise and broadcast package of programming on pay-per-view channels for overall price -- Initial order varied contract to
allow debtor to pay for movies per view -- Initial order forced creditor to provide post-production services without immediate payment since debtor could advertise movies without payment -- Order contrary to CCAA -- Debtor's termination of contract upheld as it negotiated in good faith -- Unreasonable to expect debtor to borrow money to pay contracts.

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Proceedings -- Practice and procedure -- Courts -- Jurisdiction -- CCAA matters -- Motion by creditor for finding court lacked jurisdiction to vary contract and debtor unable to repudiate contract allowed in part -- Creditor offered debtor right to advertise and broadcast package of programming on pay-per-view channels for overall price -- Initial order varied contract to allow debtor to pay for movies per view -- Initial order forced creditor to provide post-production services without immediate payment since debtor could advertise movies without payment -- Order contrary to CCAA -- Debtor's termination of contract upheld as it negotiated in good faith -- Unreasonable to expect debtor to borrow money to pay contracts.

Motion by the creditor for an ordering finding the court lacked jurisdiction to vary its contract and a finding the debtor was not able to terminate its contract. The creditor provided the debtor with the right to advertise and broadcast and package of movie programming for an overall price. The debtor operated pay-per-view stations. The debtor applied for protection from creditors and in the initial order, the court accepted its proposal and varied the contract with the creditor to allow the debtor to pay for movies per viewing. The creditor argued that the variation was outside the court's jurisdiction and created a negative incentive for the debtor to use its service. The debtor argued the variation was acceptable because there was a gap in the CCAA with respect to post-production services. The creditor refused to accept per viewing payment and the debtor repudiated from the contracts.

HELD: Motion allowed in part. This was only the initial stages of the CCAA proceedings so it was inappropriate for the court to draw up a contract for parties that had already negotiated one. The pay-per-viewing order was contrary to the CCAA, because it effectively required the creditor to provide post-production services without immediate payment. The contract between the creditor and debtor was for the service of the right to advertise and broadcast movies, not just the right to a single broadcast, so the initial order allowed the debtor to advertise without payment. The initial order was varied to remove the pay-per-viewing order. The debtor was able to terminate the contracts, however. The creditor had attempted to improve its position and become a secured creditor and refused to accept the debtor's proposal. The debtor had attempted to negotiate in good faith and it would be unreasonable to expect the debtor to borrow more money to meet its contract obligations to the creditor.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Bankruptcy Code, s. 503(b)

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11, s. 11.3(a)

Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.),

Counsel:

Frank R. Dearlove, for the Applicant, Alliance Films Inc.

Charles P. Russell, Q.C., for Allarco Entertainment Inc. and Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc.

Richard T.G. Reeson, Q.C., for Alberta Treasury Branches.

Michael J. McCabe, Q.C., for Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc.

David Ullmann, for MGM Television of Canada, a division of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

Marc-Andre Morin, for Twentieth Century Fox/Incendo Television Distribution Inc. and, Incendo Media Inc.

Harry Fogul, for Twentieth Century Fox/Incendo Television Distribution Inc.

Eric Vallieres, for TVA Films, a division of TVA Group Inc.

Patrick Roche, for Maple Pictures Corp.

Roger P. Simard, for National Bank of Canada.

Andre Bennett, President & CEO, Cinema Esperanza International Inc., for Cinema Esperanza International Inc.

Danny M. Nunes, for NBC Universal.

Bertrand Langlois, CA, VP Finance, Christal Films Distributions Inc., for Christal Films Distributions Inc.

Alan H. Brown, for Starz Media LLC.

Memorandum of Decision

J.B. VEIT J.:--

Summary

1 On June 16, 2009, the Allarco Entertainment companies, which operate Super Channel - a pay-per-view television channel - obtained protection from their creditors pursuant to the provisions of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act. As part of the initial, ex parte, order under the statute, Allarco Entertainment obtained a "pay-per-play" regime in relation to its obligations to Alliance Films Inc., a program supplier. Alliance Films now applies for a variation of the initial order: it argues that the court had no jurisdiction to grant what amounts to a major, unilateral, variation of its contracts with Allarco Entertainment. For an overall fee which was to be paid in instalments, the Alliance contracts allowed Allarco Entertainment to exhibit films and television series, including the right to exhibit through subscription video on demand, for a limited number of times over a specific time period. Alliance asserts that the contract fees are paid for the ongoing right to exhibit the films or series episodes, that there is no "pay-per-play" provision in the contracts, and that the courts should not have imposed such a variation on Alliance.

2 Alternatively, Alliance argues that if the court does have jurisdiction to approve such contract variations, the court should not have exercised its discretion in favour of this variation because a "pay-per-play" regime constitutes a negative incentive on the debtor, Allarco Entertainment, to use the service provided by Alliance.

3 Alliance Films Inc. brought this motion in July, 2009. The court adjourned the motion on the condition that Allarco Entertainment negotiate in good faith with Alliance. The resulting negotiations were unsuccessful. On August 17, 2009, Allarco Entertainment terminated its contracts with Alliance.
Films. In its amended motion, in addition to asking for a variation in relation to the "pay-per-play" term in the initial order, Alliance also now asks the court to invalidate Allarco Entertainment's terminations.

4 In its initial order, even if the court did have jurisdiction to vary the Allarco Entertainment/Alliance Film contracts by establishing a different payment structure than the one set out in the contracts, it should not have done so: a post-protection service provider usually has the right to maintain its contract prices.

5 The CCAA states that where, under licence agreements, a contractor provides new services to a debtor who has obtained creditor protection, that service provider is entitled to "immediate payment"; this is compared to the provider who provided services prior to the granting of creditor protection, whose right to enforce payment is stayed. The CCAA does not state the basis on which compensation is to be paid for post-protection services. Allarco Entertainment argues that the basis for compensation should be "what is just and reasonable"; here, the debtor claims that a "pay-per-play" payment scheme is fair because it will get rid of installment payments to Alliance, the payment of which will hinder Allarco Entertainment's ability to re-organize. Alliance Films argues that, at this stage of the CCAA proceedings, the court does not have the right to make unilateral contract changes. At this stage of the proceedings, the broad wording of the CCAA, which is remedial legislation, does allow the courts to make some contracts between debtors and creditors: for example, with respect to utilities such as electricity, the court can allow the service provider to be paid not only the usual utility rate but also a security deposit: Hydro-Québec. Another example is the court's decision that some contract provisions relate to past services, and cannot therefore be enforced, and that other contract provisions relate to post-protection services for which the debtor incurs an obligation of immediate payment: Nortel. These are examples of the limited way in which the courts have jurisdiction to vary contracts in an initial order under CCAA proceedings. It is not necessary to articulate the principle which applies to the jurisdiction of the court in relation to contracts, s. 11.3(a) of the CCAA, and initial orders, but if that were required, it may be that, in the initial order courts have only a limited jurisdiction to affect contractual rights and that contractual payment terms negotiated between debtors and creditors generally represent the payments which debtors are required to make if they use the services set out in those contracts post-protection as that scale of payment best represents both a fair and reasonable price for the services and business in the ordinary course. This principle arises from the common law's respect for contractual obligations. Generally, contracts cannot be varied by courts: contracts represent, in effect, a law which private parties have agreed applies to them. Court can interpret or rectify, but not vary, contracts. Even courts of equity generally limited themselves to deciding which contracts, or portions of contracts, would not be enforced by the justice system. Legislation could, of course, give to the courts the jurisdiction to vary or create contracts; however, given the clear state of the common law on this issue, explicit statutory provisions would be required to give courts a general jurisdiction to vary contracts. Such explicit authority is not given to courts in the CCAA at this stage of proceedings. The court's only authority in the situation here was to distinguish between those portions of the Alliance contracts which represent services that have already been performed, the enforcement of which is stayed, and those portions which deal with the provision of ongoing services, the payment for which Allarco Entertainment was required to make according to the contract if it wished to continue using Alliance's services.

6 Allarco Entertainment is, however, entitled to terminate its contracts with Alliance Films.

7 After the issuance of the initial order, Allarco Entertainment negotiated with Alliance in good faith. The granting of protection from creditors is designed to promote such negotiations. Alliance is not required to continue to provide services to Allarco Entertainment post-protection; on the other hand, Allarco Entertainment is entitled to terminate contracts. The court does have a general oversight jurisdiction to determine if the termination of a contract by a debtor is just and reasonable. On this
motion, Allarco Entertainment has satisfied that test: among other important aspects of the statutory test, the evidence establishes that, during the negotiations, Alliance Films was attempting to obtain a security status for its contracts which did not exist in its original contracts. Granting new security to Alliance post-protection would have given Alliance an advantage over other Allarco Entertainment creditors. Allarco Entertainment was in fact prevented from acceding to these attempts by Alliance Films.

Cases and authority cited


11 Appendix A: The payment schedule in the initial order

1. Background

12 The following information is uncontested, or if contested, the court is able to come to a conclusion on the existence of a fact without ordering a trial of that issue.

a) Factual

13 The Allarco Entertainment companies operate Super Channel, an English language general interest pay television channel, one of only 3 pay-per-view television channels in Canada. The business of the companies is licensed and regulated by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, CRTC. One of the licensing requirements is the delivery of a certain proportion of Canadian content programming, which requirement ensures greater value for programming packages.
which satisfy that requirement.

14 The Allarco Entertainment companies rely on broadcasting distribution undertakings, BDUs, such as Rogers, Shaw and Bell TV, to sell Super Channel as a programming option. By law, the BDUs are obligated to treat all program networks equally, and not to unfairly encourage their customers to purchase the services of one program network in preference to others. Allarco Entertainment has an ongoing complaint about one of the BDUs, alleging that that distributor has not dealt fairly with Super Channel; this complaint is now the subject of a lawsuit, which is being case managed in Ontario. In a parallel mode, Allarco Entertainment has also laid its complaints against that BDU with the CRTC; there has not yet been a resolution of those complaints by the Commission.

15 When they applied for an initial order under the CCAA, the Allarco Entertainment companies had approximately 425 outstanding program license agreements, PLAs, with various entertainment program suppliers. Although the Allarco Entertainment companies had their own form of PLA which it used whenever possible, some of the more well known program licensors required the Allarco Entertainment companies to enter into the licensors' standard form of PLA. Approximately $64,000,000.00 of programming has been delivered to the Allarco Entertainment companies, for which payment had not been made when those companies applied for protection from their creditors.

16 Allarco Entertainment's PLAs with Twentieth Century Fox are the most significant component of the Super Channel programming cost.

17 Alberta Treasury Branch is the first secured creditor of the Allarco Entertainment companies; it holds general security agreements containing a charge over Allarco Entertainment's present and after acquired personal property. The ATB facility is currently fully drawn. ATB has agreed, on certain conditions, to reestablish the MasterCard facility for Allarco Entertainment. ATB has also indicated to Allarco Entertainment that it is prepared, on certain conditions, to forbear in pursuing recovery under the guarantee of the ATB facility.

18 Alliance has 5 PLAs with Allarco Entertainment. The PLAs typically give to Allarco Entertainment the right to play the programs offered in a package on an exclusive basis. Moreover, the first time an individual program is broadcast, Allarco Entertainment can advertise the play as a premiere, which has added value over and above the rights of exclusive broadcast.

19 When Alliance first brought this motion, it was concerned mainly with two of its program licence agreements with Allarco Entertainment, the January 15, 2008 PLA - Super Channel Q1 08 package - and the February 25th 2008 PLA - Super Channel Q2 08 package. Those agreements are similarly structured. However, there are at least two important terms which are found in the latter agreement which are not found in the former.

20 The first of these terms is:

Security Interest

Licensee shall grant Licensor a security interest in respect of Licensee's payment obligations and Licensee shall execute and deliver documentation necessary to effect the foregoing.

Although Q2 2008 was agreed to and accepted by the parties on March 31st, 2008, by June 16, 2009, no security documents had been prepared by either Allarco Entertainment or Alliance Films. Alliance characterizes this contractual term as an equitable charge which has all the validity of a legal charge.
21 The second of the terms is:

Termination Rights

In the event of default by Licensee (including failure to pay amounts when due and/or if assignment for the benefit of creditors, seeks relief under any bankruptcy law or similar law for the protection of debtors, or allows a petition of bankruptcy to be filed against it, or a receiver or trustee to be appointed for substantially all of its assets that is not removed with 30 days), Licensor shall be entitled to terminate or suspend Licensee's rights with respect to programming (i) licensed hereunder; and/or (ii) licensed to Licensee by Licensor pursuant to any other agreement. In the event Licensor decides to terminate Licensee's rights to programming, all rights will automatically revert to Licensor, free and clear of any and all encumbrances and Licensor shall be entitled to immediate possession of all related materials.

In its PLAs which contained termination rights, Alliance did not terminate its contracts with Allarco Entertainment once it knew that Allarco Entertainment had obtained an initial order under the CCAA.

22 Alliance has 3 other PLAs with Allarco Entertainment. Alliance did not focus on these 3 PLAs because no payments are due at this time in relation to those agreements. Of those additional agreements: PLA 2007/2008 Allarco Package does not contain any security or termination clauses; PLA Super Channel Q4-08 package does not contain a security clause but does contain a termination clause; and, PLA Super Channel Q3-08 Package contains both a security clause and a termination clause.

23 In their applications before the Court, Allarco Entertainment has provided the court with this broad stroke explanation of what its Plan of Arrangement might entail:

- sale to a third party investor of a portion or all of the equity in the business, having in mind the value of the existing CRTC license;
- ongoing active involvement in the business by entities related to Charles R. Allard, the sole director of Allarco Entertainment Inc.;
- significant reduction in both the cost of programming and general overhead expense would allow a viable business at a much lower level of subscriber involvement;
- success in the claim against the BDU would increase the number of subscribers;
- injection of funding into the business either by way of equity or further loans.

24 The Allarco Entertainment companies proposed, and in the initial order the court approved, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. as the Monitor under these proceedings. The Monitor has not, of course, taken a position on this application; however, the Monitor reports that, to date, it has not uncovered any abusive conduct by the Allarco Entertainment companies.

25 Paragraph 16 of the initial order provided that payment under the PLAs between Allarco Entertainment and various program licensors was to be made in accordance with the terms set out in para. 43 of the affidavit of the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Allarco Entertainment companies. Those terms are set out in appendix A hereto.

26 Since the granting of the initial order, Allarco Entertainment has continued to advertise access to Alliance programming, including subscription on demand, SVOD, rights.
The initial order has been extended by court order to September 30, 2009.

There is a dispute between the parties about the proportion of the contract payments which Alliance Films has received, and would receive, since the protection order. That issue will be discussed further in relation to the termination by Allarco Entertainment of the Alliance contracts.

There is a dispute between the parties concerning the content of the negotiations which preceded the termination by Allarco Entertainment of the Alliance contracts. This dispute will be referred to in the discussion of the termination issue hereunder.

As of August 17, 2009, Allarco Entertainment repudiated its contracts with Alliance and noted, "Any damages suffered by Alliance as a result of such repudiation will be dealt with in the claims process in the CCAA proceedings".

Although the PLA providers set out in the Appearances section hereunder have been given notice of this application, only MGM has provided evidence and submissions on the motion, although many of the other parties attended the hearing by telephone. MGM is owed in excess of $1,400,000.00 in outstanding claims for licensing fees not paid to it prior to the date of the initial order in these proceedings. MGM would have expected payments in excess of $2,000,000.00 between the date of the initial order and February 2010 in the ordinary course. MGM will continue to provide Allarco with new films, at a discounted price, while MGM defers certain other payments for films which have already been delivered to Allarco. MGM is of the view that the continuation of the CCAA process is in the best interest of MGM and likely in the best interest of many other programming suppliers in these proceedings.

b) Legislative

Section 11 of the CCAA reads:

11.(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or the Winding-up Act, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

(2) An application made for the first time under this section in respect of a company, in this section referred to as an "initial application", shall be accompanied by a statement indicating the projected cash flow of the company and copies of all financial statements, audited or unaudited, prepared during the year prior to the application, or where no such statements were prepared in the prior year, a copy of the most recent such statement.

(3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or
proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);
(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

In 1997, the following amendment was made to s. 11 of the BCCA:

11.3 No order made under section 11 shall have the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or
(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

(Emphasis added)

2. At this stage of the CCAA proceedings, does the court have the jurisdiction to approve unilateral contract changes proposed by Allarco Entertainment to Alliance Film contracts?

The short answer to this question is, No.

As a prelude to the discussion of the specific issue which is before the court, the court observes that the conclusion reached by Bauman J. in Smith Brothers, a leading decision on the interpretation of s. 11.3 of the CCAA, to the effect that it is the use (emphasis in the original at para. 19) of "leased property, not the making of the lease itself, after the stay order, which is within the purview of s. 11.3 (a)" also apply here. The implications of that finding are twofold: the Alliance contracts are "true" licenses within the meaning of Smith Brothers - which means on the one hand that they are not security documents - and, Alliance cannot be forced to provide the portions of those contracts which relate to the provision of services post-protection without an immediate claim for those services.

The nature of the Alliance contracts is that they provide a service - the right to advertise and broadcast the availability of a package of programming - rather than the right to make a single broadcast.
The advertising by Allaro Entertainment of the availability of the Alliance Films packages, including SVOB rights, constitutes "use" of the Alliance Films licensed property.

37 Allaro argues that s. 11.3 (a) of the CCAA which entitles a service provider to require immediate payment for services provided after the initial order does not indicate the payment basis on which those services will be provided. Allaro Entertainment suggests that this gap in the legislation is one which the court has the jurisdiction to fill and that the test for determining payment should be what is a just and equitable basis for compensation. Alliance argues that there is no gap, or that if there is a gap, the terms of the contract relating to payment should be accepted as the proper basis for the provision of post-protection services.

38 To provide guidance in filling the gap, Allaro Entertainment proposes American jurisprudence pursuant to s. 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code which allows a court to give priority treatment to "administrative expenses". However, in order to do so, the court must conclude not only that the debt arises out of a transaction with the debtor in possession, but also that the payment of the debt is beneficial to the operation of the debtor's business. Allaro notes that the concept of "beneficial" is narrowly interpreted, as is to be expected in a regime where those administrative expenses receive priority. For example, in Knart Corporation, the bankruptcy court asserted that "post-petition performance alone does not automatically translate into a benefit to the estate, even if there was inducement on the part of the debtor"; the same principle was also applied in Enron.

39 I agree with Allaro Entertainment that there is a gap in the CCAA relating to the payment for post-protection services.

40 However, with respect, I disagree with Allaro Entertainment's proposed use of American jurisprudence. As the B.C. Court of Appeal emphasizes in West Bay SonsShip, although similar policy objectives inform Canadian and American insolvency legislation, and while certain American decisions might even be persuasive in certain Canadian insolvency situations, in each specific potential use of American jurisprudence care must be exercised to ensure that, in the particular case, both the American legislative scheme is similar to that in Canada and, in the absence of expert evidence on the state of American law, that the American reasoning in a particular case is not conflated with the state of American jurisprudence on the issue.

41 For example, here the Alliance Films PLAs are, in Canadian or Albertan parlance, executory contracts. However, American authorities are not helpful on the treatment of "executory contracts" in the CCAA partly because the specialized interpretation of that term in American bankruptcy law is different from the interpretation of that term in Alberta and perhaps in Canada:

31 In "A Joint Report of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals - Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform - March 15, 2002", the authors cited the following meanings for "executory contract":

What is an executory contract? Neither the CCAA nor the BIA use the expression, but the United States Bankruptcy Code does in s. 365 ("Code, s. 365"). In general contract law, "executory contract" means a contract under which one or both parties still have obligations to perform. However, in U.S. bankruptcy law the expression is normally given a narrower meaning. According to the most widely accepted definition in the United States, an executory contract for the purposes of Code s. 365 is:
a contract under which both the obligations of the bankrupt ["A"] under the contract and the other party to the contract ["B"] are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.


42 More pertinently in this particular case, while there is in the American Bankruptcy Code a priority for administrative expenses which include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate", there is no such limitation in s. 11.3 of the CCAA. Here, all post-protection service providers are entitled to claim immediate payment for their services. Therefore, the American jurisprudence is not, in this particular case, helpful.

43 In any event, however, no decision has been brought to my attention in which an American court has, other than in a utility situation which will be discussed later in the context of Canadian case law, itself calculated a price other than the contract price for the provision of post-protection services. Indeed, the weight of American jurisprudence on the issue appears to be that the contract price is assumed to be a reasonable price unless the debtor can show that the contract price is clearly unreasonable.

44 In the circumstances here, rather than to rely on American jurisprudence for guidance, it is more appropriate to rely on Canadian law and on first principles. As has been noted in much of the jurisprudence which interprets the CCAA, there is jurisdiction in the statute for a court to work out arrangements that will maximize benefits to all affected parties. As our Court of Appeal put it in Smoky River Coal, (Re):

16 CCAA orders become the roadmap for the proceedings and the litigation which may follow. Orders must therefore be drafted with clarity and precision. The purpose of the CCAA must be kept at the forefront in both drafting and interpreting a CCAA order. The CCAA is remedial legislation. As was stated in Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1992), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div):

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable a plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court.

(Emphasis added)

45 The court's jurisdiction is not, however, unlimited. One limiting feature is the timing of the court's intervention. There is no doubt that, at the stage of the approval or failure of a plan, a court can impose terms on an unwilling creditor. We are not, however, at that stage.

46 At this stage, that is the stage of the initial order, whatever services are provided post-protection are offered by service providers who are entitled to be paid for those services. Generally, two payment regimes will be adopted. One is that ongoing service providers will accept, at least until the presentation of a plan, some new, negotiated, plan. Obviously if the parties to a contract agree to a variation of the terms of that contract, that variation governs. However, a service provider is not required to provide
post-protection services without the right to claim immediate payment. If a service provider will not agree to modify its contractual payment terms in order to provide post-protection services, then the debtor must either terminate the contract or pay the contractual amount. In reaching this conclusion, I rely on the fact that, at the stage of the initial order, it would be inappropriate for a court to attempt to draw up a contract for the parties. What the parties have negotiated in a contract should generally be presumed to be a fair and reasonable price for the services provided. Not only are courts not business experts, but the cost of attempting to bring the court up to speed on the reasons that a creditor and a debtor each have for advancing a payment proposal would exhaust the financial capacity of an already insolvent debtor. At the stage of the presentation of a plan, the situation is, of course, different: at that stage the court has much more information on which to rely, including the business acumen of all other creditors.

47 Two exceptions to the general rule that contract terms govern have been identified in the jurisprudence. First, there are utility contracts: see Hydro-Québec. Even though the original contract for service did not contain any form of security payment, a court approved a security deposit as a term of post-protection provision of services. The provision of utilities is, however, a unique form of contract. On the one hand, utility contracts are contracts of adhesion whose payment terms are typically regulated by government or government-established commissions, and, on the other, the debtor does not typically have any choice in service providers. In those circumstances, it is appropriate for a court to set the terms of payment for post-protection services since a utility provider should not be required to provide post-protection services which require the advance of further credit: see s. 11.3(b). It appears that American jurisprudence takes a similar view with respect to utilities: see Thatcher Glass. The crucial nature of utility services requires the intervention of the court where the parties cannot agree on a fee for post-protection services; in other circumstances, a service provider can protect itself by refusing to provide services. These principles are usefully addressed by the Court of Appeal in Hydro-Québec:

80 L’alinéa a) de l’article 11.3 de la LACC établit un principe clair : pendant la période de suspension, le fournisseur a droit d’être payé pour les services qu’il rend au fur et à mesure de leur utilisation.

81 Voici d’ailleurs les commentaires du professeur Richard H. McLaren au sujet de cet article:

Section 11.3 acts as an exemption to the stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA. It appears the section is meant to balance the rights of creditors with debtors. The section addresses the concern that judges had too much discretion in issuing stays. Under s. 11.3(a), if a person supplies goods or services or if the debtor continues to occupy or use leased or licensed property, the court will not issue a stay order with respect to the payment for such goods or services or leased or licensed property. In essence, s. 11.3(a) will not permit the court to prohibit these individuals from demanding payment from the debtor for goods, services or use of leased property, after a court order is made.

82 Ce principe connaît cependant des limites pratiques. Il arrive parfois que la réalité s'oppose à ce que le fournisseur soit payé immédiatement pour les services qu'il fournit à une compagnie débitrice. La fourniture d'électricité en est un exemple patent : il s'agit d'un service continu qu'il est impossible de facturer au fur et à mesure de la consommation.

83 En pareilles circonstances, il est juste et équitable pour le fournisseur de services de demander des garanties de paiement. Commentant la décision Re Smoky River
Coal Ltd.17, les auteurs Houlden, Morawetz et Sarra déclarent:

Under its inherent powers, the court can create a security for creditors who supply goods and services to the debtor after the filing of a CCAA petition and can provide for the priority and ranking of such a security interest with respect to other security holders. If the plan under the CCAA fails, the court can determine who are entitled to share in the proceeds of the security interest.18

87 Au sujet du droit applicable, le juge Rolland s'exprime en ces termes:

[13] Il découle de ce qui précède qu'un fournisseur ne peut exiger d'être payé d'avance pour un service à fournir.

[14] Ainsi, un créancier peut exiger d'être payé immédiatement lors de la livraison, mais pas de recevoir un paiement d'avance pour des services à fournir.

[15] La situation est relativement simple lorsqu'il s'agit d'un bien individualisé, vendu et livré.

[16] Cela peut être plus compliqué dans les cas d'un approvisionnement continu d'un service comme l'électricité, le téléphone ou le gaz.

[17] Exiger de la débitrice qu'elle paie un mois d'avance comme le demande Gaz Métro, alors qu'elle entend fermer plus de 30 locaux au cours des prochains jours ou semaines, a pour effet de créer un fardeau trop onéreux pour la débitrice.

[18] La LACC ne fait pas exception quant aux créanciers qu'il s'agisse de fournisseur d'un service continu par opposition à un fournisseur de biens.

[19] Le tribunal a discrétion pour établir une procédure permettant au fournisseur de ne pas être préféré ou pénalisé par rapport aux autres créanciers.

(je souligne)

48 In that particular case, the court concluded that a $42,000.00 guarantee was reasonable in the circumstances.

49 The second exception from the obligation to pay the contract price for post-protection service, an exception which constitutes a lesser intrusion on the freedom of contract than the outright establishment of new payment terms, is the selection by a court from amongst the provisions of one contract of certain services for which the debtor must pay the contract price while other provisions are identified as ones for which the debtor is not immediately required to pay: Nortel. In that case, the contract - a collective agreement - included both payments to persons who were no longer providing service to the debtor and payments to persons who were providing post-protection service to the debtor. The union advanced two arguments in support of its claim that all contract payments should be made post-protection. The first was that the services that had been provided in the past were part of the consideration for services that were being provided post-protection. The second was that, because of a statutory requirement, the union
did not have the freedom which most service providers have, to refuse to provide ongoing service to a
debtor which has received protection from its creditors. (On this latter point, there is a certain analogy
between the union - which could not, for legislative reasons, withdraw its services despite the wording
of s. 11.3(a) - and Alliance, which cannot withdraw the services which it provided in three contracts
because those contracts grant licences to Allarco Entertainment without termination rights arising on
insolvency.) The Nortel court rejected both arguments. Although the court decided which portions of the
contract had to be paid, it did not purport to vary the contractual basis for payment; it merely decided
which portions of the contract were eligible for payment post-protection.

50 It appears that a similar approach was taken in Les Boutiques San Francisco: the debtor could
either decide to terminate the contract for display shelves, or pay the contract price for those units.

51 There may be other exceptions to the general rule but I have not been provided with any Canadian
case law which has identified any such exceptions.

52 The two exceptions to the rule that post-protection services are to be paid according to the contract
price reenforce the generality of the rule. Generally, contracts cannot be varied by courts: they can be
interpreted or rectified but not varied. Even courts of equity limited themselves to remedies which
recognized the basic authority of contracts: a court of equity might, for example, require a contracting
party to render proper accounts even though that was not a term of the contract if the rendering of
accounts was necessary to enforce the contract. Similarly, a court of equity might grant relief from the
consequences of certain contracts - such as contracts that were unconscionable. In other cases, a court
might decide that, for public policy reasons, certain contracts, such as gambling contracts, would not be
enforced by the justice system.

53 Legislation could, of course, give to the courts a broad jurisdiction to create or vary contracts or to
over-ride them. An example of the latter is the Divorce Act which provides that a court should taken into
account any contract between the parties in relation, for example, to spousal support, but that the court is
not limited in making a spousal support order by the terms of the contract between the parties.

54 Given the respect for contracts in the common law, explicit statutory provisions are required to
give courts the jurisdiction to impose unilateral variations in contracts. Such explicit authority is not
given to courts in the CCAA at the initial order stage.

55 Moreover, as was noted at the outset, it is important to correctly identify the nature of the Alliance
PLAs: these are not pay-per-play contracts, but rather contracts which allow Allarco Entertainment to
advertise the availability of Alliance product without in fact broadcasting Alliance product. The effect of
imposing a pay-per-play payment term on Alliance at this stage would be to impose upon Alliance the
obligation to provide a continuing service - allowing Allarco Entertainment to continue to advertise the
availability of Alliance programming - without providing payment for that service. Indeed, as Alliance
has emphasized, Allarco Entertainment's web-site continued, post-protection, to advertise Alliance
programming. It is not necessary on this application to determine whether forcing Alliance to continue
to provide its services to Allarco Entertainment can also be characterized as requiring Alliance to make a
further advance of credit to Allarco.

56 For the reasons set out above, having now heard argument from the party affected, this court varies
para. 16 of its initial, ex parte, order by removing the reference to para. 43(b) of the Knox affidavit and
replacing it with a reference to the contractual payments due to Alliance.

3. Should the court invalidate Allarco Entertainment's termination of the

Alliance Films contracts?

57 The short answer to this question is, No.

58 Alliance correctly states that the statutory right of a debtor which has obtained protection from its creditors to terminate contracts is subject to judicial oversight. Alliance argues that it is not reasonable for Allarco Entertainment to terminate its contracts because:

- Allarco was able to obtain a "pay-per-play" clause and they should therefore be required to honour the contracts;
- the exchanges between Allarco and itself establish that Allarco was intent on obtaining a "pay-per-play" provision to give itself additional, inappropriate, power in its negotiations with Alliance;
- it is not appropriate for Allarco Entertainment to defend its actions by starting from the proposition that it has only so much cash available; rather, Allarco should be required to raise additional funds;
- Allarco Entertainment did not negotiate in good faith.

59 For the purpose of this application, the court sets the following test which Allarco Entertainment must meet for termination of its contracts with Alliance Films: the termination must be fair, appropriate, reasonable, and must have been issued after good faith negotiations. I have concluded that Allarco Entertainment meets that test.

60 In coming to that conclusion, the most important of the reasons considered by the court is the evidence that Alliance attempted, during the negotiations, to become a secured creditor, an effort that would have given Alliance an unfair advantage over other Allarco Entertainment creditors. The fact that Alliance was negotiating for such security benefits is acknowledged by Alliance; it takes the position, however, that this was not a "new" feature since some of its contracts contained provision for granting security. With respect, this is not defensible. Each contract must be enforced on its own; three of the Alliance contracts did not contain a security clause. With respect to those agreements, the addition of a security clause would be "new". Moreover, even with respect to those two contracts which did contain a security clause, no security documents had been executed.

61 In addition to the grave concern about Alliance attempting to improve its position relative to other debtors, there are other factors which the court weighs in Allarco Entertainment's favour in concluding that it should not invalidate Allarco's termination of Alliance contracts:

- while it is true that, during the negotiations, Allarco Entertainment was the beneficiary of a "pay-per-play" regime and had thus obtained what it wanted relative to Alliance as a creditor, Allarco Entertainment was also aware that Alliance had attacked the legitimacy of that provision. While on this motion Allarco valiantly argued in favour of the "pay-per-play" regime relative to Alliance, it is not unreasonable to assume that Allarco also came to an informed decision that it was at least vulnerable on that issue;

- there was a reasonable business basis for Allarco Entertainment's original application for a "pay-for-play" regime relative to Alliance. It appears to me that the main business argument in Allarco's failure is that substantial ongoing payments to Alliance throughout the year as opposed to what the evidence describes as the overwhelming position in other contracts which provide for payments at the beginning and at the end of the licence period, or at the beginning, after 12 months
and at the end of the licence period seriously hamper Allarco's attempts to establish a plan which would allow them to go forward rather than to fall into bankruptcy;

- there is a dispute between Allarco Entertainment and Alliance about the cost to Alliance of the "pay-per-play" provision: Allarco states that it had paid more than 5 cents on the dollar of contractual obligations. Alliance states that termination of its contracts will place it in a worse position that the PLA providers with whom Allarco has been able to reach an accommodation. While it may be true that termination will be less advantageous to Alliance than going forward on some accommodation basis, part of the point of the CCAA is to allow for the termination of some contracts so long as the test for termination is met;

- similarly, it is a reasonable business concern of Allarco's to have fresh programming to offer potential subscribers and that such programming not consist solely of leftovers from other potential licensees;

- it would not make sense to impose upon an insolvent company the obligation to borrow more money in order to meet all its debts before it terminated certain of its contracts. Such an inflexible rule would make an effective reorganization impossible. On the evidence on this motion, at this stage of the CCAA proceedings, Allarco Entertainment has made reasonable arrangements with its banker and guarantor;

- there is no evidence that Allarco negotiated in bad faith. Rather, the evidence suggests that Allarco was attempting to make reasonable accommodations with Alliance. For example, it is not reasonable that Allarco should be required to take only that programming which has been refused by all other potential licensees. Nor is it the case that Alliance is irrevocably linked to Allarco: Alliance has other markets to which it can offer its programming;

- finally, the opinion of MGM - a creditor which is roughly in the same position relative to Allarco Entertainment as is Alliance - that there have been significant changes in the business of all affected companies which legitimizes the writing down of entertainment packages for the purposes of the development of a CCAA plan supports the general approach which Allarco Entertainment has taken in the negotiations.

62 Although Alliance Film's notice of motion requests an order invalidating Allarco Entertainment's termination of the Alliance Films contract, at the hearing Alliance suggested that what it really wanted was a determination of the variation agreement first. If that issue were resolved in its favour, Alliance then hoped that further negotiations with Allarco Entertainment would be possible. Alliance suggested that even if Allarco Entertainment were to maintain its termination of the contracts, then Alliance may require some additional evidence to support its position that the termination should not be approved. With respect, I cannot adopt that approach. The determination about whether a termination at this stage meets the required test should be made as close as possible to the date of termination in order to ensure that the court has the same overall perspective as did the parties as of the date of termination.

4. Costs

63 If the parties are not agreed on costs, I may be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision.
J.B. VEIT J.

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Appendix A

The following are the portions of para. 43 of Mr. Knox's first affidavit which are incorporated by reference in para. 16 of the initial court order:

(a) For those existing Program License Agreements in which the fee for delivery of a single broadcast, such as a prize fight, must be paid upon delivery of that Program, the cash flow contemplates such payment as each Program is delivered;

(b) In the case of those existing Program License Agreements with fixed terms and with a limited number of Exhibition Days, and where the license window is already open, the Cash Flow Projections have been prepared based upon a formula where the overall cost of the Contract is divided by the total number of Exhibition Days permitted, with that Exhibition Day rate being applied for the number of Exhibition Days the Business actually runs that program during the Cash Flow Projection period;

(c) For existing Program Licensing Agreements which provide for monthly payments, those payments falling due during the CCAA proceedings will be paid;

(d) As a license window opens during the CCAA Proceedings on a Licensing Agreement now in existence, license fees shall be paid in accordance with that Licensing Agreement; and

(e) For Programming which is obtained by the Business during the CCAA Proceedings under Licensing Agreements not now in existence, the licensing fees shall be paid in accordance with the terms of each such Program License Agreement.

(Emphasis added)

The only program licence agreements which come within the terms set out in para. (b) above are the Alliance Films Inc. PLAs.
| Tab 8 |
Case Name:
Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the other applicants listed on schedule "A"


59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

2009 CanLII 55114

2009 CarswellOnt 6184

181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853

Court File No. CV-09-8241-OOCL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.E. Pepall J.

October 13, 2009.

(60 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Affiliated debtor companies -- Application by Canwest Global for relief under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to several partnerships allowed -- Applicant Canwest Global owned CMI which was insolvent -- CMI Entities and Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders had agreed on terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction -- Stay under Act was extended to several partnerships that were intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations -- DIP and administration charges approved -- Applicants were also permitted to pay pre-filing liabilities to their critical suppliers.

Application by Canwest Global for relief under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to several partnerships. The applicants were affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding $5 million. The partnerships were intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. Canwest was a leading Canadian media company. Canwest Global owned 100 per cent of CMI. CMI had direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. The CMI Entities generated the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising. Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment, they experienced a decline in their
advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. The stay of proceedings was sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual pre-packaged recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and an Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders had agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which was intended to form the basis of the plan. The applicants anticipated that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities would continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. Certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction had already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

HELD: Application allowed. The CMI Entities were unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and were insolvent. Absent these proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. It was just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships. The operations and obligations of the partnerships were so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. The DIP charge for up to $100 million was appropriate and required having regard to the debtors’ cash-flow statement. The administration charge was also approved. Notice had been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the amount was appropriate, and the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries. The applicants were also permitted to pay pre-filing liabilities to their critical suppliers.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c. 36, s. 11, s. 11(2), s. 11.2, s. 11.2(1), s. 11.52

Counsel:

Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers and Jeremy Dacks, for the Applicants.

Alan Merskey, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova, for the Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Benjamin Zarnett and Robert Chadwick, for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Edmond Lamek, for the Asper Family.

Peter H. Griffin and Peter J. Osborne, for the Management Directors and Royal Bank of Canada.

Hilary Clarke, for Bank of Nova Scotia,

Steve Weisz, for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

____________________________________________________________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

Relief Requested

1. Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary,
Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.¹ The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest’s free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Background Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.
Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to $75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of $4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of $5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling $2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately $954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by $272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by $253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of $1.578 billion compared to $22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by $8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was $21 million compared to $39 million in the same period in 2008.

The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of $75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to $23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges

http://www.lexisnexis.com/ca/legal/delivery/PrintDoc.do?fromCartFullDoc=false&fileSi...
against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor’s report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of $100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH’s interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately $634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of $10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of $187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of $430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than $2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

21 The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of $13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of $32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of
which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The
Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires
on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately
250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their
payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding
as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their
pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings.
It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its
representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the
CCAA.

Proposed Order

23 I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the
presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard
submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

24 This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force
on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and
principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and
academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from
the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to
extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs
for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that
objective in mind.

   (a) Threshold Issues

25 Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business
is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding $5
million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity
to make an interest payment in the amount of US$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and
none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets
of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to
satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in Re Stelco. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable
to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit
filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required
under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

   (b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and
to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given
the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their
(b) **Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries**

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.⁵; Re Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc.⁶; and Re Calpine Canada Energy Ltd.⁷. In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Re Cadillac Fairview*⁸ and *Re Global Light Telecommunications Ltd.*⁹

(c) **DIP Financing**

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

1. On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

2. The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

3. The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

4. In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,
(aa) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

32 In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to $100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately $10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

34 Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is $10.7 in outstanding letters of credit.
These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

35 Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

39 As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to $15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial

advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-named professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

1. On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

2. If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

3. If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.

4. The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming,
newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants’ request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors’ and Officers’ Charge

44 The applicants also seek a directors’ and officers’ ("D & O") charge in the amount of $20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first $85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director’s or officer’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director’s or officer’s gross or intentional fault.

46 I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of $20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of
the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for $30 million in coverage and $10 million in excess coverage for a total of $40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: Re General Publishing Co.10 Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of $5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them.

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in Re Grant Forest11 have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)12 provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure
of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor’s website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest’s various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from $1000 to $5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor’s website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor’s report should customarily be filed with a request for
an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

S.E. PEPALL J.

* * * *

SCHEDULE A

[Editor's note: Schedule "A" was not attached to the copy received by LexisNexis Canada and therefore is not included in the judgment.]

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended
2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.
5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275.
11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344. That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.
Tab 9
Case Name:  
Jaguar Mining (Re)  

RE: IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended  
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of  
Jaguar Mining Inc., Applicant  

[2014] O.J. No. 214  
12 C.B.R. (6th) 290  
236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 820  
2013 CarswellOnt 18630  

Court File No. CV-13-10383-00CL  

Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
Commercial List  

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.  


(50 paras.)  

Corporations, partnerships and associations law -- Corporations -- Arrangement -- Application to court -- Powers of court -- Approval -- Fair and reasonable -- Application by Jaguar Mining for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act allowed -- Jaguar was holding company with registered office in Toronto -- Parent company to subsidiaries that carried on active gold mining -- Current liabilities exceeded assets by $40 million -- Recapitalization supported by unsecured creditors -- Jaguar faced liquidity crisis and was insolvent -- Stay of proceedings to Jaguar's subsidiaries was appropriate given Jaguar depended on them for their value generating capacity -- Reasonable and appropriate to grant administration charge and director's charge over Jaguar's property.  

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Where total claim exceeds $5,000,000 -- Compromises and arrangements -- With unsecured creditors -- Applications -- Initial applications -- Costs of administration -- Application by Jaguar Mining for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act allowed -- Jaguar was holding company with registered office in Toronto -- Parent company to subsidiaries that carried on active gold mining -- Current liabilities exceeded assets by $40 million -- Recapitalization supported by unsecured creditors -- Jaguar faced liquidity crisis and was insolvent -- Stay of proceedings to Jaguar's subsidiaries was appropriate given Jaguar depended on them for their value generating capacity -- Reasonable and appropriate to grant administration charge and director's charge over Jaguar's
Application by Jaguar Mining for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Jaguar was a holding company with a registered office in Toronto and no active business operations. It was the public parent company to several corporations that carried on active gold mining and exploration in Brazil. Its subsidiaries' assets included properties in the development and production stages. Jaguar's objective was to effect a recapitalization and financing transaction on an expedited basis through a plan of compromise and arrangement to provide a financial foundation for Jaguar and its subsidiaries to continue to work towards its operational and financial goals. The recapitalization was expected to result in the reduction of over $268 million of debt and new liquidity upon exit of $50 million. Jaguar's senior unsecured convertible notes were the primary liabilities affected by the recapitalization. Jaguar had not paid the latest interest payment due on the notes and was in default. Its current liabilities exceeded its assets by $40 million. The recapitalization was supported by an ad hoc committee of note holders. Jaguar sought an administrative charge and director's charge over its property.

HELD: Application allowed. Jaguar faced a liquidity crisis and was insolvent. It had complied with its obligations under s. 10(2) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. A stay of proceedings to Jaguar's subsidiaries was appropriate given Jaguar depended on them for their value generating capacity. It was reasonable and appropriate to grant the administration charge and director's charge over Jaguar's property. Engagement letters were approved and sealed given they contained sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the parties at issue. An Initial Order, Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order were granted to assist Jaguar's quick implementation of the recapitalization.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16,

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 10(2), s. 11.51, s. 11.52, s. 22(2)

Counsel:

Tony Reyes and Evan Cobb, for the Applicant, Jaguar Mining Inc.

Robert J. Chadwick and Caroline Descours, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Note holders.

Joseph Bellissimo, for Global Resource Fund, Secured Lender.

Jeremy Dacks, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Proposed Monitor.

Robin B. Schwill, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors.

REASONS

G.B. MORAWETZ R.S.J.:

ENDORSEMENT

1 On December 23, 2013, I heard the CCAA application of Jaguar Mining Inc. ("Jaguar") and made the following three endorsements:

1. CCAA protection granted. Initial Order signed. Reasons will follow. It is expected that parties will utilize the e-Service Protocol which can be confirmed on comeback motion. Sealing Order of confidential exhibits granted.


2. These are my reasons.

3. Jaguar sought protection from its creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") and requested authorization to commence a process for the approval and implementation of a plan of compromise and arrangement affecting its unsecured creditors.

4. Jaguar also requested certain protections in favour of its wholly-owned subsidiaries that are not applicants (the "Subsidiaries" and, together with the Applicant, the "Jaguar Group").

5. Counsel to Jaguar submits that the principal objective of these proceedings is to effect a recapitalization and financing transaction (the "Recapitalization") on an expedited basis through a plan of compromise and arrangement (the "Plan") to provide a financial foundation for the Jaguar Group going forward and additional liquidity to allow the Jaguar Group to continue to work towards its operational and financial goals. The Recapitalization, if implemented, is expected to result in a reduction of over $268 million of debt and new liquidity upon exit of approximately $50 million.

6. Jaguar's senior unsecured convertible notes (the "Notes") are the primary liabilities affected by the Recapitalization. Any other affected liabilities of Jaguar, which is a holding company with no active business operations, are limited and identifiable.

7. The Recapitalization is supported by an Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders of the Notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders") and other Consenting Noteholders, who collectively represent approximately 93% of the Notes.

8. The background facts are set out in the affidavit of David M. Petrov sworn December 23, 2013 (the "Petrov Affidavit"), the important points of which are summarized below.


10. Jaguar is the public parent corporation of other corporations in the Jaguar Group that carry on active gold mining and exploration in Brazil, employing in excess of 1,000 people. Jaguar itself does not carry on active gold mining operations.

11. Jaguar has three wholly-owned Brazilian operating subsidiaries: MCT Mineração Ltda. ("MCT"), Mineração Serras do Oeste Ltda. ("MSOL") and Mineração Turmalina Ltda. ("MTL") (and, together with MCT and MSOL, the "Subsidiaries"), all incorporated in Brazil.

12. The Subsidiaries' assets include properties in the development stage and in the production stage.

13. Jaguar has been the main corporate vehicle through which financing has been raised for the operations of the Jaguar Group. The Subsidiaries have guaranteed repayment of certain funds borrowed by Jaguar.

14. Jaguar has raised debt financing by (a) issuing notes, and (b) borrowing from Renvest Mercantile
Bank Corp. Inc., through its global resource fund ("Renvest").

15 In aggregate, Jaguar has issued a principal amount of $268.5 million of Notes through two transactions, known as the "2014 Notes" and the "2016 Notes".

16 Interest is paid semi-annually on the 2014 Notes and the 2016 Notes. Jaguar has not paid the last interest payment due on November 1, 2013. Under the 2014 Notes, the grace period has lapsed and an event of default has occurred.

17 Jaguar is also the borrower under a fully drawn $30 million secured facility (the "Renvest Facility") with Renvest. The obligations under the Renvest Facility are secured by a general security agreement from Jaguar as well as guarantees and collateral security granted by each of the Subsidiaries.

18 Jaguar has identified another potential liability. Mr. Daniel Titcomb, former chief executive officer of Jaguar, and certain other associated parties, have instituted a legal proceeding against Jaguar and certain of its current and former directors that is currently proceeding in the United States Federal Court. Counsel to Jaguar submits that this lawsuit alleges certain employment-related claims and other claims in respect of equity interests in Jaguar that are held by Mr. Titcomb and others. Counsel to Jaguar advises that Jaguar and its board of directors believe this lawsuit to be without merit.

19 Counsel also advises that, aside from the lawsuit and professional service fees incurred by Jaguar, the unsecured liabilities of Jaguar are not material.

20 The Jaguar Group's mines are not low-cost gold producers and the recent decline in the price of gold has negatively impacted the Jaguar Group.

21 Based on current world prices and Jaguar Group's current level of expenditures, the Jaguar Group is expected to cease to have sufficient cash resources to continue operations early in the first quarter of 2014.

22 Counsel also submits that, as a result of Jaguar's event of default under the 2014 Notes, certain remedies have become available, including the possible acceleration of the principal amount and accrued and unpaid interest on the 2014 Notes. As of November 13, 2013, that principal and accrued interest totalled approximately $169.3 million.

23 Jaguar's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the nine months ending September 30, 2013 show that Jaguar had an accumulated deficit of over $317 million and a net loss of over $82 million for the nine months ending September 30, 2013. Jaguar's current liabilities (at book value) exceed Jaguar's current assets (at book value) by approximately $40 million.

24 I accept that Jaguar faces a liquidity crisis and is insolvent.

25 Jaguar has been involved in a strategic review over the past two years. Counsel submits that the efforts of Jaguar and its advisors have shown that a comprehensive restructuring plan involving a debt-to-equity exchange and an investment of new money is the best available alternative to address Jaguar's financial issues.

26 Counsel to Jaguar advises that the board of directors of Jaguar has determined that the Recapitalization is the best available option to Jaguar and, further, that the plan cannot be implemented outside of a CCAA proceeding. Counsel emphasizes that without the protection of the CCAA, Jaguar is exposed to the immediate risk that enforcement steps may be taken under a variety of debt instruments. Further, Jaguar is not in a position to satisfy obligations that may result from such enforcement steps.
27 Jaguar requests a stay of proceedings in favour of non-applicant Subsidiaries contending that, because of Jaguar's dependence upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity, the commencement of any proceedings or the exercise of rights or remedies against these Subsidiaries would be detrimental to Jaguar's restructuring efforts and would undermine a process that would otherwise benefit Jaguar Group's stakeholders as a whole.

28 Jaguar also seeks a charge on its current and future assets (the "Property") in the maximum amount of $5 million (a $500,000 first-ranking charge (the "Primary Administration Charge") and a $4.5 million fourth-ranking charge (the "Subordinated Administration Charge") (together, the "Administration Charge"). The purpose of the charge is to secure the fees and disbursements incurred in connection with services rendered both before and after the commencement of the CCAA proceedings by various professionals, as well as Canaccord Genuity and Houlihan Lokey, as financial advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee (collectively, the "Financial Advisors").

29 Counsel advises that the Financial Advisors' monthly work fees (but not their success fees) will be secured by the Primary Administration Charge, while the Financial Advisors' success fees will be secured solely by the Subordinated Administration Charge.

30 Counsel further advises that the Proposed Initial Order contemplates the establishment of a charge on Jaguar's Property in the amount of $150,000 (the "Director's Charge") to protect the directors and officers. Counsel further advises that the benefit of the Director's Charge will only be available to the extent that a liability is not covered by existing directors and officers insurance. The directors and officers have indicated that, due to the potential for personal liability, they may not continue their service in this restructuring unless the Initial Order grants the Director's Charge.

31 Counsel to Jaguar further advises that the proposed monitor is of the view that the Director's Charge and the Administration Charge are reasonable in these circumstances.

32 Jaguar is unaware of any secured creditors, other than those who have received notice of the application, who are likely to be affected by the court-ordered charges.

33 In addition to the Initial Order, Jaguar also seeks a Claims Procedure Order and a Meeting Order, submitting that it must complete the Recapitalization on an expedited timeline.

34 Each of the Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order include a comeback provision.

35 Having reviewed the record and upon hearing submissions, I am satisfied the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies. It is insolvent and faces a looming liquidity crisis. The Applicant is subject to claims in excess of $5 million and has assets in Canada. I am also satisfied that the application is properly before me as the Applicant's registered office and certain of its assets are situated in Toronto, Ontario.

36 I am also satisfied that the Applicant has complied with the obligations of s. 10(2) of the CCAA.

37 I am also satisfied that an extension of the stay of proceedings to the Subsidiaries of Jaguar is appropriate in the circumstances. Further, I am also satisfied that it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the Administration Charge and the Director's Charge over the Property of the Applicant. In these circumstances, I am also prepared to approve the Engagement Letters and to seal the terms of the Engagement Letters. In deciding on the sealing provision, I have taken into account that the Engagement Letters contain sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the parties at issue. However, as I indicated at the hearing, this issue should be revisited at the comeback hearing.
38 I am also satisfied that Jaguar should be authorized to comply with the pre-filing obligations to the extent provided in the Initial Order.

39 In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, I reviewed the argument submitted by counsel to Jaguar that the stay of proceedings against non-applicants is appropriate. The Jaguar Group operates in a fully integrated manner and depends upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity. Absent a stay of proceedings not only in favour of Jaguar but also in favour of the Subsidiaries, various creditors would be in a position to take enforcement steps which could conceivably lead to a failed restructuring, which would not be in the best interests of Jaguar's stakeholders.


41 The authority to grant the court-ordered Administration Charge and Director's Charge is contained in ss. 11.51 and 11.52 of the CCAA.

42 In granting the Administration Charge, I am satisfied that:

(i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
(ii) the amount is appropriate; and
(iii) the charges should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

43 In considering both the amount of the Administration Charge and who should be entitled to its benefit, the following factors can also be considered:

(a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured; and
(b) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles.


44 In this case, the proposed restructuring involves the proposed beneficiaries of the charge. I accept that many have played a significant role in the negotiation of the Recapitalization to date and will continue to play a role in the implementation of the Recapitalization. I am satisfied that there is no unwarranted duplication of roles among those who benefit from the proposed Administration Charge.

45 With respect to the Director's Charge, the court must be satisfied that:

(i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
(ii) the amount is appropriate;
(iii) the applicant could not obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost; and
(iv) the charge does not apply in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

46 A review of the evidence satisfies me that it is appropriate to grant the Director's Charge as requested.

47 Jaguar requested that the Initial Order authorize it to perform certain pre-filing obligations in respect of professional service providers and third parties who provide services in respect of Jaguar's
public listing agreement. In the circumstances, I find it to be reasonable that Jaguar be authorized to perform these pre-filing obligations.

48 In view of Jaguar's desire to move quickly to implement the Recapitalization, I have also been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Claims Procedure Order and the Meeting Order at this time. These are procedural steps in the CCAA process and do not require any assessment by the court as to the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan at this stage.

49 Counsel to Jaguar submits that Jaguar's approach to classification of the affected unsecured creditors is appropriate in these circumstances, citing a commonality of interest. Counsel also references s. 22(2) of the CCAA. For the purposes of today's motion, I am prepared to accept this argument. However, this is an issue that can, if raised, be reviewed at the comeback hearing.

50 In the result, an Initial Order is granted together with a Meeting Order and Claims Procedure Order. All orders have been signed in the form presented.

G.B. MORAWETZ R.S.J.
Tab 10
Case Name:
4519922 Canada Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985,
C.C-36 as Amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise
or Arrangement of 4519922 Canada
Inc.

[2015] O.J. No. 115
2015 ONSC 124
2015 CarswellOnt 178
249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 508
22 C.B.R. (6th) 44

Court File No.: CV-1410791-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

F.J.C. Newbould J.


(81 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Applications -- Initial applications -- Motion by Chrysler Canada to set aside Initial Order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act dismissed -- Initial Order extended its protection to CLCA of which debtor was a partner and to CLCA's insurers, and stayed outstanding litigation during pendency of these proceedings -- Chrysler had very large claim against CLCA in the outstanding litigation -- Debtor was insolvent -- Not extending stay to CLCA and the Castor litigation would significantly impair the effectiveness of the stay in respect of the debtor.

Motion by Chrysler Canada to set aside an Initial Order granting the numbered company protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The initial order extended its protection to Coopers & Lybrand (CLCA), of which the debtor was a partner and to CLCA's insurers, and stayed outstanding litigation relating to Castor Holdings Limited during the pendency of these proceedings. As a partner of CLCA, the debtor was liable as a principal for the partnership's debts incurred while it was a partner. Chrysler had a very large claim against CLCA in the outstanding litigation and had not been given
notice of the application for the initial order. Chrysler argued that the debtor had not established that it was insolvent. The only asset of the debtor on its balance sheet was its investment of $100 in CLCA. At the time of the granting of the Initial Order, the proposed Monitor stated in its report that the applicant was insolvent based on its review of the financial affairs of the debtor and CLCA.

HELD: Motion dismissed. The debtor was insolvent. It was highly likely that the $100 investment of the debtor in CLCA was worthless and unable to fund debtor's current and future obligations caused by the CLCA litigation. If the stay against the debtor contained in the Initial Order was maintained, it should extend to CLCA and the outstanding Castor litigation. The affairs of the applicant and CLCA were clearly intertwined. Not extending the stay to CLCA and the Castor litigation would significantly impair the effectiveness of the stay in respect of the debtor. CLCA was a necessary party to achieve a resolution of the outstanding litigation and significant contributions from its interest in another company and from its former partners were anticipated under the term sheet in exchange for releases to be provided to them. Chrysler's contingent claim was not scheduled to be tried until 2017 at the earliest, and it would likely still proceed to trial as scheduled if a global resolution could not be achieved in the course of the present proceeding. Since Chrysler had not obtained a judgment or settlement in respect of its contingent claim, the Initial Order had not stayed any immediate right available to Chrysler.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3,

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 2(1)(a), s. 3(1)

Counsel:

Robert I. Thornton, John T. Porter, Lee M. Nicholson and Asim Iqbal, for the Applicant.

Harry M. Fogul, for 22 former CLCA partners.

Orestes Pasparakis and Evan Cobb, for the Insurers.

Avram Fishman and Mark Meland, for the German and Canadian Bank Groups, the Widdrington Estate and the Trustee of Castor Holdings Limited.

James H. Grout, for 22 former CLCA partners.

Chris Reed, for 8 former CLCA partners.

Andrew Kent, for 5 former CLCA partners.

Richard B. Jones, for one former CLCA partner.

John MacDonald, for Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP.

James A. Woods, Sylvain Vauclair, Bogdan Catanu and Neil Peden, for Chrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company.

Jay A. Swartz, for the proposed Monitor Ernst & Young Inc.

ENDORSEMENT

1  F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.-- On December 8, 2014 the applicant 4519922 Canada Inc. ("451"), applied for an Initial Order granting it protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"), extending the protection of the Initial Order to the partnership Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts ("CLCA"), of which it is a partner and to CLCA's insurers, and to stay the outstanding litigation in the Quebec Superior Court relating to Castor Holdings Limited ("Castor") during the pendency of these proceedings. The relief was supported by the Canadian and German bank groups who are plaintiffs in the Quebec litigation, by the Widdrington Estate that has a final judgment against CLCA, by the insurers of CLCA and by 22 former CLCA partners who appeared on the application.

2  The material in the application included a term sheet which the applicant wishes to use as a basis of a plan and which provides for an injection of approximately $220 million in return for a release from any further litigation. The term sheet was supported by all parties who appeared.

3  I granted the order with a stay to January 7, 2015 for reasons to follow, but in light of the fact that Chrysler Canada Inc., with a very large claim against CLCA in the litigation, had not been given notice of the application, ordered that Chrysler be given notice to make any submissions regarding the Initial Order if it wished to do so.

4  Chrysler has now moved to set aside the Initial Order, or in the alternative to vary it to delete the appointment of a creditors' committee and the provision for payment of the committee's legal fees and expenses. On the return of Chrysler's motion, a number of other former CLCA partners and PricewaterhouseCoopers appeared in support of the granting of the Initial Order.

Structure of Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts

5  The applicant 451 is a corporation continued pursuant to the provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act, and its registered head office is in Toronto, Ontario. It and 4519931 Canada Inc. ("4519931") are the only partners of CLCA.

6  CLCA is a partnership governed by the Partnerships Act (Ontario) with its registered head office located in Toronto, Ontario. It was originally established in 1980 under the name of "Coopers & Lybrand" and was engaged in the accountancy profession. On September 2, 1985, the name "Coopers & Lybrand" was changed to "Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants" and the partnership continued in the accountancy profession operating under the new name. Until 1998, CLCA was a national firm of chartered accountants that provided audit and accounting services from offices located across Canada and was a member of a global network of professional firms.

7  In order to comply with the requirements of the various provincial Institutes of Chartered Accountants across Canada, many of which restricted chartered accountants providing audit services from being partners with persons who were not chartered accountants, Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group ("CLCG") was established under the Partnerships Act (Ontario) in September 1985 to provide management consulting services. Concurrent with the formation of CLCG, Coopers & Lybrand ("OpCo") was established as a partnership of CLCA, CLCG and two other parties to develop and manage the CLCA audit and CLCG management consulting practices that had to remain separate. Until 1998, OpCo owned most of the operating assets of CLCA and CLCG. OpCo is governed by the Partnerships Act (Ontario) and its registered head office is in Toronto.

8  In 1998, the member firms of the global networks of each of Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse agreed upon a business combination of the two franchises. To effect the transaction in
Canada, substantially all of CLCA’s and CLCG’s business assets were sold to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC"), which entity combined the operations of the Coopers & Lybrand entities and Price Waterhouse entities, and the partners of CLCA and CLCG at that time became partners of PwC. Subsequent to the closing of the PwC transaction, CLCA continued for the purpose of winding up its obligations and CLCA and CLCG retained their partnership interests in OpCo. By 2006, all individual CLCA partners had resigned and been replaced by two corporate partners to ensure CLCA’s continued existence to deal with the continuing claims and obligations.

9 Since 1998, OpCo has administered the wind up of CLCA and CLCG’s affairs, in addition to its own affairs, including satisfying outstanding legacy obligations, liquidating assets and administering CLCA’s defence in the Castor litigation. In conjunction with OpCo, 451 and 4519931 have overseen the continued wind up of CLCA’s affairs. The sole shareholders of 451 and 4519931 are two former CLCA partners. 451 and 4519931 have no assets or interests aside from their partnership interests in CLCA.

**Castor Holdings litigation**

10 Commencing in 1993, 96 plaintiffs commenced negligence actions against CLCA and 311 of its individual partners claiming approximately $1 billion in damages. The claims arose from financial statements prepared by Castor and audited by CLCA, as well as certain share valuation letters and certificates for "legal for life" opinions. The claims are for losses relating to investments in or loans made to Castor in the period 1988 to 1991. A critical issue in the Castor litigation was whether CLCA was negligent in doing its work during the period 1988-1991.

11 Fifty-six claims have either been settled or discontinued. Currently, with interest, the plaintiffs in the Castor litigation collectively claim in excess of $1.5 billion.

12 Due to the commonality of the negligence issues raised in the actions, it was decided that a single case, brought by Peter Widdrington claiming damages in the amount of $2,672,960, would proceed to trial and all other actions in the Castor litigation would be suspended pending the outcome of the Widdrington trial. All plaintiffs in the Castor litigation were given status in the Widdrington trial on the issues common to the various claims and the determination regarding common issues, including the issues of negligence and applicable law, was to be binding in all other cases.

13 The first trial in the Widdrington action commenced in September 1998, but ultimately was aborted in 2006 due to the presiding judge’s illness and subsequent retirement. The new trial commenced in January 2008 before Madam Justice St. Pierre. A decision was rendered in April 2011 in which she held that Castor’s audited consolidated financial statements for the period of 1988-1990 were materially misstated and misleading and that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during that period. She noted that that the overwhelming majority of CLCA’s partners did not have any involvement with Castor or the auditing of the financial statements prepared by Castor.

14 The decision in the Widdrington action was appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal which on the common issues largely upheld the lower court’s judgment. The only common issue that was overturned was the nature of the defendant partners’ liability. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that under Quebec law, the defendant partners were severally liable. As such, each individual defendant partner is potentially and contingently responsible for his or her several share of the damages suffered by each plaintiff in each action in the Castor litigation for the period that he or she was a partner in the years of the negligence.

15 On January 9, 2014, the defendants’ application for leave to appeal the Widdrington decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.
The Widdrington action has resulted in a judgment in the amount of $4,978,897.51, inclusive of interest, a cost award in the amount of $15,896,297.26 plus interest, a special fee cost award in the amount of $2.5 million plus interest, and a determination of the common issue that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during the relevant period.

There remain 26 separate actions representing 40 claims that have not yet been tried. Including interest, the remaining plaintiffs now claim more than $1.5 billion in damages. Issues of causation, reliance, contributory negligence and damages are involved in them.

The Castor Litigation has given rise to additional related litigation:

(a) Castor's trustee in bankruptcy has challenged the transfer in 1998 of substantially all of the assets used in CLCA's business to PwC under the provisions of Quebec's bulk sales legislation. As part of the PwC transaction, CLCA, OpCo and CLCG agreed to indemnify PwC from any losses that it may suffer arising from any failure on the part of CLCA, OpCo or CLCG to comply with the requirements of any bulk sales legislation applicable to the PwC transaction. In the event that PwC suffers any loss arising from the bulk sales action, it has the right to assert an indemnity claim against CLCA, OpCo and CLCG.

(b) Certain of the plaintiffs have brought an action against 51 insurers of CLCA. They seek a declaration that the policies issued by the insurers are subject to Quebec law. The action would determine whether the insurance coverage is costs-inclusive (i.e. defence costs and other expenses are counted towards the total insurance coverage) or costs-in-addition (i.e. amounts paid for the defence of claims do not erode the policy limits). The insurers assert that any insurance coverage is costs-inclusive and has been exhausted. If the insurers succeed, there will be no more insurance to cover claims. If the insurers do not succeed and the insurance policies are deemed to be costs-in-addition, the insurers may assert claims against CLCA for further premiums resulting from the more extensive coverage.

(c) The claim against the insurers was set to proceed to trial in mid-January 2015 for approximately six months. CLCA is participating in the litigation as a mis-en-cause and it has all the rights of a defendant to contest the action and is bound by the result. As a result of the stay in the Initial Order, the trial has been put off.

(d) There have been eight actions brought in the Quebec Superior Court challenging transactions undertaken by certain partners and parties related to them (typically a spouse) (the "Paulian Actions").

(e) There is a pending appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal involving an order authorizing the examination after judgment in the Widdrington action of Mr. David W. Smith.

The next trial to proceed against CLCA and the individual partners will be in respect of claims made by three German banks. It is not expected to start until at least the fall of 2015 and a final determination is unlikely until 2017 at the earliest, with any appeals taking longer. It is anticipated that
the next trial after the three German banks trial will be in respect of Chrysler's claim. Mr. Woods, who acts for Chrysler, anticipates that it will not start until 2017 with a trial decision perhaps being given in 2019 or 2020, with any appeals taking longer. The remaining claims will not proceed until after the Chrysler trial.

20 The fees incurred by OpCo and CLCA in the defence of the Widdrington action are already in excess of $70 million. The total spent by all parties already amounts to at least $150 million. There is evidence before me of various judges in Quebec being critical of the way in which the defence of the Widdrington action has been conducted in a "scorched earth" manner.

**Individual partner defendants**

21 Of the original 311 defendant partners, twenty-seven are now deceased. Over one hundred and fifty are over sixty-five years of age, and sixty-five more will reach sixty-five years of age within five years. There is a dispute about the number of defendant partners who were partners of CLCA at the material time. CLCA believes that twenty-six were wrongly named in the Castor litigation (and most have now been removed), a further three were named in actions that were subsequently discontinued, some were partners for only a portion of the 1988-1991 period and some were named in certain actions but not others. Six of the defendant partners have already made assignments in bankruptcy.

**Analysis**

(i) **Applicability of the CCAA**

22 Section 3(1) of the CCAA provides that it applies to a debtor company where the total claims against the debtor company exceed $5 million. By virtue of section 2(1)(a), a debtor company includes a company that is insolvent. Chrysler contends that the applicant has not established that it is insolvent.

23 The insolvency of a debtor is assessed at the time of the filing of the CCAA application. While the CCAA does not define "insolvent", the definition of "insolvent person" under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is commonly referred to for guidance although the BIA definition is given an expanded meaning under the CCAA. See Holden, Morawetz & Sarra, the 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Carswell) at Ns.12 and Re Steico Inc. (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (per Farley J.); leave to appeal to the C of A refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (C.A.).

24 The BIA defines "insolvent person" as follows:

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due;

25 The applicant submits that it is insolvent under all of these tests.
The applicant 451 is a debtor company. It is a partner of CLCA and is liable as a principal for the partnership’s debts incurred while it is a partner.

At present, CLCA’s outstanding obligations for which the applicant 451 is liable include: (i) various post-retirement obligations owed to former CLCA partners, the present value of which is approximately $6.25 million (the “Pre-71 Entitlements”); (ii) $16,026,189 payable to OpCo on account of a loan advanced by OpCo on October 17, 2011 to allow CLCA to pay certain defence costs relating to the Castor litigation; (iii) the Widdrington costs award in the amount of $18,783,761.66, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, which became due and payable to the plaintiff’s counsel on November 27, 2014; (iv) the special fee in the amount of $2,675,000, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, awarded to the plaintiff’s counsel in the Widdrington action; and (v) contingent liabilities relating to or arising from the Castor litigation, the claims of which with interest that have not yet been decided being approximately $1.5 billion.

The only asset of the applicant 451 on its balance sheet is its investment of $100 in CLCA. The applicant is a partner in CLCA which in turn is a partner in OpCo. At the time of the granting of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc., the proposed Monitor, stated in its report that the applicant was insolvent based on its review of the financial affairs of the applicant, CLCA and OpCo.

Mr. Peden in argument on behalf of Chrysler analyzed the balance sheets of CLCA and OpCo and concluded that there were some $39 million in realizable assets against liabilities of some $21 million, leaving some $18 million in what he said were liquid assets. Therefore he concluded that these assets of $18 million are available to take care of the liabilities of 451.

I cannot accept this analysis. It was unsupported by any expert accounting evidence and involved assumptions regarding netting out amounts, one of some $6.5 million owing to pre-1971 retired partners, and one of some $16 million owing by CLCA to OpCo for defence costs funded by OpCo. He did not consider the contingent claims against the $6.5 million under the indemnity provided to PWC, nor did he consider that the $16 million was unlikely to be collectible by OpCo as explained in the notes to the financial statements of 451.

This analysis also ignored the contingent $1.5 billion liabilities of CLCA in the remaining Castor litigation and the effect that would have on the defence costs and for which the applicant 451 will have liability and a contingent liability for cost awards rendered in that litigation against CLCA. These contingent liabilities must be taken into account in an insolvency analysis under the subsection (c) definition of an insolvent person in the BIA which refers to obligations due and accruing due. In *Re Steleco*, supra, Farley J. stated that all liabilities, contingent or unliquidated, have to be taken into account. See also *Re Muscletech Research & Development Inc.* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (per Farley J.).

It is obvious in this case that if the litigation continues, the defence costs for which the applicant 451 will have liability alone will continue and will more than eat up whatever cash OpCo may have. As well, the contingent liabilities of CLCA in the remaining $1.5 billion in claims cannot be ignored just because CLCA has entered defences in all of them. The negligence of CLCA has been established for all of these remaining cases in the Widdrington test case. The term sheet provides that the claims of the German and Canadian banks, approximately $720 million in total, and the claim of the Trustee of CLCA of approximately $108 million, will be accepted for voting and distribution purposes in a plan of arrangement. While there is no evidence before me at this stage what has led to the decision of CLCA and its former partners to now accept these claims, I can only conclude that in the circumstances it was considered by these defendants that there was exceptional risk in the actions succeeding. I hesitate to say a great deal about this as the agreement in the term sheet to accept these claims for voting and
distribution purposes will no doubt be the subject of further debate in these proceedings at the appropriate time.

33 As stated, the balance sheet of the applicant 451 lists as its sole asset its investment of $100 in CLCA. The notes to the financial statements state that CLCA was indebted to OpCo at the time, being June 30, 2014, for approximately $16 million and that its only asset available to satisfy that liability was its investment in OpCo on which it was highly likely that there would be no recovery. As a result 451 would not have assets to support its liabilities to OpCo.

34 For this reason, as well as the contingent risks of liability of CLCA in the remaining claims of $1.5 billion, it is highly likely that the $100 investment of the applicant 451 in CLCA is worthless and unable to fund the current and future obligations of the applicant caused by the CLCA litigation.

35 I accept the conclusion of Ernst & Young Inc. that the applicant 451 is insolvent. I find that the applicant has established its insolvency at the time of the commencement of this CCAA proceeding.

(ii) Should an Initial Order be made and if so should it extend to CLCA?

36 The applicant moved for a stay in its favour and moved as well to extend the stay to CLCA and all of the outstanding Castor litigation. I granted that relief in the Initial Order. Chrysler contends that there should be no stay of any kind. It has not expressly argued that if a stay is granted against the applicant it should not be extended to CLCA, but the tenor of its arguments would encompass that.

37 I am satisfied that if the stay against the applicant contained in the Initial Order is maintained, it should extend to CLCA and the outstanding Castor litigation. A CCAA court may exercise its jurisdiction to extend protection by way of the stay of proceedings to a partnership related to an applicant where it is just and reasonable or just and convenient to do so. The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of a debtor company are so intertwined with those of a partner or limited partnership in question that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor company. See Re Prizm Income Fund (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 per Morawetz J. The stay is not granted under section 11 of the CCAA but rather under the court's inherent jurisdiction. It has its genesis in Re Lehnдорff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 and has been followed in several cases, including Canwest Publishing Inc. (2010) 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 per Pepall J. (as she then was) and Re Calpine Energy Canada Ltd. (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 per Romaine J.

38 The applicant 451's sole asset is its partnership interest in the CLCA partnership and its liabilities are derived solely from that interest. The affairs of the applicant and CLCA are clearly intertwined. Not extending the stay to CLCA and the Castor litigation would significantly impair the effectiveness of the stay in respect of 451. It would in fact denude it of any force at all as the litigation costs would mount and it would in all likelihood destroy any ability to achieve a global settlement of the litigation. CLCA is a necessary party to achieve a resolution of the outstanding litigation, and significant contributions from its interest in OpCo and from its former partners are anticipated under the term sheet in exchange for releases to be provided to them.

39 Chrysler relies on the principle that if the technical requirements for a CCAA application are met, there is discretion in a court to deny the application, and contends that for several reasons the equities in this case require the application to be met. It says that there is no business being carried on by the applicant or by CLCA and that there is no need for a CCAA proceeding to effect a sale of any assets as a going concern. It says there will be no restructuring of a business.

40 Cases under the CCAA have progressed since the earlier cases such as Hongkong Bank v. Chef Ready Foods (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 which expressed the purpose of the CCAA to be to permit
insolvent companies to emerge and continue in business. The CCAA is not restricted to companies that are to be kept in business. See *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1299 at para. 33 (per Brown J. as he then was). There are numerous cases in which CCAA proceedings were permitted without any business being conducted.

41 To cite a few, in *MuscleTech Research and Development Inc. (Re)* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 the applicants sought relief under the CCAA principally as a means of achieving a global resolution of a large number of product liability and other lawsuits. The applicants had sold all of its operating assets prior to the CCAA application and had no remaining operating business. In *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Re)*, 2013 QCCS 3777 arising out of the Lac-Mégantic train disaster, it was acknowledged that the debtor would be sold or dismantled in the course of the CCAA proceedings. The CCAA proceedings were brought to deal with litigation claims against it and others. In *Crystallex International Corp. (Re)* 2011 ONSC 7701 (Comm. List) the CCAA is currently being utilized by a company with no operating business, the only asset of which is an arbitration claim.

42 Chrysler contends, as stated in its factum, that the pith and substance of this case is not about the rescue of a business; it is to shield the former partners of CLCA from their liabilities in a manner that should not be approved by this court. Chrysler refers to several statements by judges beginning in 2006 in the Castor litigation who have been critical of the way in which the Widdrington test case has been defended, using such phrases as "a procedural war of attrition" and "scorched earth" strategies. Chrysler contends that now that the insurance proceeds have run out and the former partners face the prospect of bearing the cost of litigation which that plaintiffs have had to bear throughout the 22-year war of attrition, the former partners have convinced the German and Canadian banks to agree to the compromise set out in the term sheet. To grant them relief now would, it is contended, reward their improper conduct.

43 Chrysler refers to a recent decision in Alberta, *Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership (Re)*, 2014 ABQB 65 in which a CCAA application was denied and a receiver appointed at the request of its first secured creditor. In that case Justice Thomas referred to a statement of Justice Romaine in *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp.,* 2013 ABQB 432 in which she stated that an applicant had to establish that it has acted and is acting in good faith and with due diligence. Justice Thomas referred to past failures of the applicant to act with due diligence in resolving its financial issues and on that ground denied the CCAA application. Chrysler likens that to the manner in which the Widdrington test case was defended by CLCA.

44 I am not entirely sure what Justice Romaine precisely had in mind in referring to the need for an applicant to establish that "it has acted and is acting with good faith and with due diligence" but I would think it surprising that a CCAA application should be defeated on the failure of an applicant to have dealt with its affairs in a diligent manner in the past. That could probably said to have been the situation in a majority of cases, or at least arguably so, and in my view the purpose of CCAA protection is to attempt to make the best of a bad situation without great debate whether the business in the past was properly carried out. Did the MM&A railway in Lac-Mégantic act with due diligence in its safety practices? It may well not have, but that could not have been a factor considered in the decision to give it CCAA protection.

45 I do understand that need for an applicant to act in the CCAA process with due diligence and good faith, but I would be reluctant to lay down any fixed rule as to how an applicant's actions prior to the CCAA application should be considered. I agree with the statement of Farley J. in *MuscleTech Research and Development Inc. (Re)* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57 that it is the good faith of an applicant in the CCAA proceedings that is the issue:
Allegations ... of bad faith as to past activities have been made against the CCAA applicants and the Gardiner interests. However, the question of good faith is with respect to how these parties are conducting themselves in these CCAA proceedings.

46 There is no issue as to the good faith of the applicant in this CCAA proceeding. I would not set aside the Initial Order and dismiss the application on the basis of the defence tactics in the Widdrington test case.

47 The Castor litigation has embroiled CLCA and the individual partners for over 20 years. If the litigation is not settled, it will take many more years. Chrysler concedes that it likely will take at least until 2020 for the trial process on its claim to play out and then several more years for the appellate process to take its course. Other claims will follow the Chrysler claim. The costs have been enormous and will continue to escalate.

48 OpCo has dedicated all of its resources to the defence of the Castor litigation and it will continue to do so. OpCo has ceased distributions to its partners, including CLCA, in order to preserve funds for the purpose of funding the defence of the litigation. If the Castor litigation continues, further legal and other costs will be incurred by OpCo and judgments may be rendered against CLCA and its partners. If so, those costs and judgments will have to be paid by OpCo through advances from OpCo to CLCA. Since CLCA has no sources of revenue or cash inflow other than OpCo, the liabilities of CLCA, and therefore the applicant, will only increase.

49 If the litigation is not settled, CLCA's only option will be to continue in its defence of the various actions until either it has completely depleted its current assets (thereby exposing the defendant partners to future capital calls), or a satisfactory settlement or judicial determination has been reached. If no such settlement or final determination is achieved, the cost of the defence of the actions could fall to the defendant partners in their personal capacities. If a resolution cannot be reached, the amount that will be available for settlement will continue to decrease due to ongoing legal costs and other factors while at the same time, the damages claimed by the plaintiffs will continue to increase due to accruing interest. With the commencement of further trials, the rate of decrease of assets by funding legal costs will accelerate.

50 After a final determination had been reached on the merits in the Widdrington action, CLCA's board of directors created a committee comprised of certain of its members to consider the next steps in dealing with CLCA's affairs given that, with the passage of time, the defendant partners may ultimately be liable in respect of negligence arising from the Castor audits without a settlement.

51 Over the course of several months, the committee and the defendant partners evaluated many possible settlement structures and alternatives and after conferring with counsel for various plaintiffs in the Castor litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a further mediation. Multiple attempts had earlier been made to mediate a settlement. Most recently, over the course of four weeks in September and October 2014, the parties attended mediation sessions, both plenary and individually. Chrysler participated in the mediation.

52 Although a settlement could not be reached, the applicant and others supporting the applicant believe that significant progress was achieved in the mediation. In light of this momentum, the applicant and CLCA continued settlement discussions with certain plaintiffs willing to engage in negotiations. These discussions culminated with the execution of a term sheet outlining a plan of arrangement under the CCAA that could achieve a global resolution to the outstanding litigation.

53 A CCAA proceeding will permit the applicant and its stakeholders a means of attempting to arrive at a global settlement of all claims. If there is no settlement, the future looks bleak for everyone but the
lawyers fighting the litigation.

54 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It is also intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Without a stay, such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan would succeed. See Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 per Farley J.

55 In this case it would be unfair to one plaintiff who is far down the line on a trial list to have to watch another plaintiff with an earlier trial date win and collect on a judgment from persons who may not have the funds to pay a later judgment. That would be chaos that should be avoided. A recent example of a stay being made to avoid such a possibility is the case of Re Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Co. which stayed litigation arising out of the Lac-Mégant train disaster. See also Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re.

56 In this case, the term sheet that the applicant anticipates will form the basis of a proposed Plan includes, among other elements:

(a) the monetization of all assets of CLCA and its partnership OpCo to maximize the net proceeds available to fund the plan, including all applicable insurance entitlements that are payable or may become payable, which proceeds will be available to satisfy the determined or agreed claims of valid creditors;

(b) contributions from a significant majority of the defendant partners;

(c) contributions from non-defendant partners of CLCA and CLCG exposed under the PwC indemnity;

(d) contributions from CLCA's insurers and other defendants in the outstanding litigation;

(e) the appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as Monitor to oversee the implementation of the plan, including to assist with the realization and monetization of assets and to oversee (i) the capital calls to be made upon the defendant partners, (ii) a claims process, and (iii) the distribution of the aggregate proceeds in accordance with the plan; and

(f) provision to all parties who contribute amounts under the plan, of a court-approved full and final release from and bar order against any and all claims, both present and future, of any kind or nature arising from or in any way related to Castor.

57 This term sheet is supported by the overwhelming number of creditors, including 13 German banks, 8 Canadian banks, over 100 creditors of Castor represented by the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor and the Widdrington estate. It is also supported by the insurers. The plaintiffs other than Chrysler, representing approximately 71.2% of the face value of contingent claims asserted in the outstanding litigation against CLCA, either support, do not oppose or take no position in respect of the
granting of the Initial Order. Chrysler represents approximately 28.8% of the face value of the claims.

58 Counsel for the German and Canadian banks points out that it has been counsel to them in the Castor claims and was counsel for the Widdrington estate in its successful action. The German and Canadian banks in their factum agree that during the course of the outstanding litigation over the past 20 years, they have been subjected to a "scorched earth", "war of attrition" litigation strategy adopted by CLCA and its former legal counsel. Where they seriously part company with Chrysler is that they vigorously disagree that such historical misconduct should prevent the CLCA group from using the CCAA to try to achieve the proposed global settlement with their creditors in order to finally put an end to this war of attrition and to enable all valid creditors to finally receive some measure of recovery for their losses.

59 It is argued by the banks and others that if Chrysler is successful in defeating the CCAA proceedings, the consequence would be to punish all remaining Castor plaintiffs and to deprive them of the opportunity of arriving at a global settlement, thus exacerbating the prejudice which they have already suffered. Chrysler, as only one creditor of the CLCA group, is seeking to impose its will on all other creditors by attempting to prevent them from voting on the proposed Plan; essentially, the tyranny of the minority over the majority. I think the banks have a point. The court's primary concern under the CCAA must be for the debtor and all of its creditors. While it is understandable that an individual creditor may seek to obtain as much leverage as possible to enhance its negotiating position, the objectives and purposes of a CCAA should not be frustrated by the self-interest of a single creditor. See Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re, 2007 ABCA 266, at para 38, per O'Brien J.A.

60 The German and Canadian banks deny that their resolve has finally been broken by the CLCA in its defence of the Castor litigation. On the contrary, they state a belief that due to litigation successes achieved to date, the time is now ripe to seek to resolve the outstanding litigation and to prevent any further dissipation of the assets of those stakeholders funding the global settlement. Their counsel expressed their believe that if the litigation continues as suggested by Chrysler, the former partners will likely end up bankrupt and unable to put in to the plan what is now proposed by them. They see a change in the attitude of CLCA by the appointment of a new committee of partners to oversee this application and the appointment of new CCAA counsel in whom they perceive an attitude to come to a resolution. They see CLCA as now acting in good faith.

61 Whether the banks are correct in their judgments and whether they will succeed in this attempt remains to be seen, but they should not be prevented from trying. I see no prejudice to Chrysler. Chrysler's contingent claim is not scheduled to be tried until 2017 at the earliest, and it will likely still proceed to trial as scheduled if a global resolution cannot be achieved in the course of this CCAA proceeding. Further, since Chrysler has not obtained a judgment or settlement in respect of its contingent claim, the Initial Order has not stayed any immediate right available to Chrysler. The parties next scheduled to proceed to trial in the outstanding litigation who have appeared, the insurers and then the three German banks, which are arguably the most affected by the issuance of a stay of proceedings, have indicated their support for this CCAA proceeding and Initial Order, including the stay of proceedings.

62 What exactly Chrysler seeks in preventing this CCAA application from proceeding is not clear. It is hard to think that it wants another 10 years of hard fought litigation before its claim is finally dealt with. During argument, Mr. Vauclair did say that Chrysler participated in the unsuccessful mediation and that it has been willing to negotiate. That remains to be seen, but this CCAA process will give it that opportunity.

63 Chrysler raises issues with the term sheet, including the provision that the claims of the German and Canadian banks and the Trustee of Castor will be accepted but that the Chrysler claim will be determined in a claims process. Chrysler raises issues regarding the proposed claims process and
whether the individual CLCA former partners should be required to disclose all of their assets. These issues are premature and can be dealt with later in the proceedings as required.

64 Mr. Kent, who represents a number of former CLCA partners, said in argument that the situation cries out for settlement and that there are many victims other than the creditors, namely the vast majority of the former CLCA partners throughout Canada who had nothing to do with the actions of the few who were engaged in the Castor audit. The trial judge noted that the main CLCA partner who was complicit in the Castor Ponzi scheme hid from his partners his relationships with the perpetrators of the scheme.

65 Mr. Kent’s statement that the situation cries out for settlement has support in the language of the trial judge in the Widdrington test case. Madame Justice St. Pierre said in her opening paragraph on her lengthy decision:

1 Time has come to put an end to the longest running judicial saga in the legal history of Quebec and Canada.

66 At the conclusion of her decision, she stated:

3637 Defendants say litigation is far from being finished since debates will continue on individual issues (reliance and damages), on a case by case basis, in the other files. They might be right. They might be wrong. They have to remember that litigating all the other files is only one of multiple options. Now that the litigants have on hand answers to all common issues, resolving the remaining conflicts otherwise is clearly an option (for example, resorting to alternative modes of conflict resolution).

67 In my view the CCAA is well able to provide the parties with a structure to attempt to resolve the outstanding Castor litigation. The Chrysler motion to set aside the Initial Order and to dismiss the CCAA application is dismissed.

(iii) Should the stay be extended to the insurers?

68 The applicant 451 moves as well to extend the stay to the insurers of CLCA. This is supported by the insurers. The trial against the insurers was scheduled to commence on January 12, 2015 but after the Initial Order was made, it was adjourned pending the outcome of the motion by Chrysler to set aside the Initial Order. Chrysler has made no argument that if the Initial Order is permitted to stand that it should be amended to remove the stay of the action against the insurers.

69 Under the term sheet intended to form the basis of a plan to be proposed by the applicant, the insurers have agreed to contribute a substantial amount towards a global settlement. It could not be expected that they would be prepared to do so if the litigation were permitted to proceed against them with all of the costs and risks associated with that litigation. Moreover, it could well have an effect on the other stakeholders who are prepared to contribute towards a settlement.

70 A stay is in the inherent jurisdiction of a court if it is in the interests of justice to do so. While many third party stays have been in favour of partners to applicant corporations, the principle is not limited to that situation. It could not be as the interests of justice will vary depending on the particulars of any case.

71 In Re Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Co., Castonguay, J.C.S. stayed litigation against the insurers of the railway. In doing so, he referred to the exceptional circumstances and the multiplicity of proceedings already instituted and concluded it was in the interests of sound administration of justice to stay the proceedings, stating:
En raison des circonstances exceptionnelles de la présente affaire et devant la multiplicité des recours déjà intentés et de ceux qui le seront sous peu, il est dans l'intérêt d'une saine administration de la justice d'accorder cette demande de MMA et d'étendre la suspension des recours à XL.

72 In my view, it is in the interests of justice that the stay of proceedings extend to the action against the insurers.

(iv) Should a creditors' committee be ordered and its fees paid by CLCA?

73 The Initial Order provides for a creditors' committee comprised of one representative of the German bank group, one representative of the Canadian bank group, and the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor. It also provides that CLCA shall be entitled to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of legal counsel to the creditors' committee. Chrysler opposes these provisions.

74 The essential argument of Chrysler is that a creditors' committee is not necessary as the same law firm represents all of the banks and the Trustee of Castor. Counsel for the banks and the Trustee state that the German bank group consists of 13 distinct financial institutions and the Canadian bank group consists of 8 distinct financial institutions and that there is no evidence in the record to the effect that their interests do not diverge on material issues. As for the Castor Trustee, it represents the interests of more than 100 creditors of Castor, including Chrysler, the German and Canadian bank groups, and various other creditors. They say that a creditors' committee brings order and allows for effective communication with all creditors.

75 CCAA courts routinely recognize and accept ad hoc creditors' committees. It is common for critical groups of critical creditors to form an ad hoc creditors' committee and confer with the debtor prior to a CCAA filing as part of out-of-court restructuring efforts and to continue to function as an ad hoc committee during the CCAA proceedings. See Robert J. Chadwick & Derek R. Bulas, "Ad Hoc Creditors' Committees in CCAA Proceedings: The Result of a Changing and Expanding Restructuring World", in Janis P. Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2011 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell) 119 at pp 120-121.

76 Chrysler refers to the fact that it is not to be a member of the creditors' committee. It does not ask to be one. Mr. Meland, counsel for the two bank groups and for the Trustee of Castor said during argument that they have no objection if Chrysler wants to join the committee. If Chrysler wished to join the committee, however, it would need to be considered as to whether antagonism, if any, with other members would rob the committee of any benefit.

77 Chrysler also takes exception to what it says is a faulty claims process proposed in the term sheet involving the creditors' committee. Whether Chrysler is right or not in its concern, that would not be a reason to deny the existence of the committee but rather would be a matter for discussion when a proposed claims process came before the court for approval.

78 The creditors' committee in this case is the result of an intensely negotiated term sheet that forms the foundation of a plan. The creditors' committee was involved in negotiating the term sheet. Altering the terms of the term sheet by removing the creditors' committee could frustrate the applicant's ability to develop a viable plan and could jeopardize the existing support from the majority of claimants. I would not accede to Chrysler's request to remove the Creditors' committee.

79 So far as the costs of the committee are concerned, I see this as mainly a final cri de coeur from Chrysler. The costs in relation to the amounts at stake will no doubt be relatively minimal. Chrysler says
it is galling to see it having to pay 28% (the size of its claim relative to the other claims) to a committee that it thinks will work against its interests. Whether the committee will work against its interests is unknown. I would note that it is not yet Chrysler's money, but CLCA's. If there is no successful outcome to the CCAA process, the costs of the committee will have been borne by CLCA. If the plan is successful on its present terms, there will be $220 million available to pay claims, none of which will have come from Chrysler. I would not change the Initial Order an deny the right of CLCA to pay the costs of the creditors' committee.

80 Finally, Chrysler asks that if the costs are permitted to be paid by CLCA, a special detailed budget should be made and provided to Chrysler along with the amounts actually paid. I see no need for any particular order. The budget for these fees is and will be continued to be contained in the cash flow forecast provided by the Monitor and comparisons of actual to budget will be provided by the Monitor in the future in the normal course.

Conclusion

81 The motion of Chrysler is dismissed. The terms of the Initial Order are continued.

F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
VICTORIAN ORDER OF NURSES FOR CANADA

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES
(Re motion returnable January 19, 2016)

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